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Abstract
We experimentally investigate the role of reciprocity in sustaining the emergence of
implicit collusive agreements in hierarchical organizations. We show that when an
agent hires, on behalf of the principal, one worker out of two candidates: i) low
ability workers, being less entitled to be selected, are more likely to exert eort in a
task that is exclusively benecial to the agent; ii) as a consequence, agents distort
the hiring process in favor of low ability workers and iii) sharing a small part of the
organization's prots with the workers alleviates their eort distortion.
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1 Introduction
The possibility that managers and bureaucrats buy the cooperation and the loyalty of
their subordinates at the expense of the organization characterizes many hierarchical or-
ganizations (Edwards, 1979). Employees who are promoted or hired based on their loyalty
towards their supervisors, and not on their merit, are more likely to invest their time and
attention to maintaining good relations with their boss, rather than improving their job
performance (Pearce et al., 2000). Tirole (1986) highlights how, in a three-tier principal-
supervisor-agent model, collusion between the supervisor and the agent can be sustained
by a norm of reciprocity. Laont (1988, 1990) generalizes the notion of moral hazard to
include hidden gaming, dened as the \ability that some players may have to design and
play games with other members of the hierarchy by which they benet from others while
they are not observable by the principal" (Laont, 1990, p.302).
In this paper, we provide the rst experimental evidence that reciprocity sustains hidden
gaming in hierarchical organizations. First, we show the emergence of backscratching be-
tween members at the lowest and at the intermediate level of a three-tier organization, at
the expense of the principal. Agents, who select workers for a job on behalf of the principal,
are more likely to hire candidates with lower ability. These candidates feel less entitled for
the position and thus they are more prone to devote their eort in favor of the agent who
selected them. Second, we design a compensation scheme which, without increasing the
cost of the principal, limits the detrimental eect of backscratching reciprocity.
In our experiment, we render a three-tier organization formed by one principal, one agent,
and one worker. The worker has to be chosen from a pool of two candidates who dier
in their ability.1 The principal, in contrast to the agent, is not able to distinguish the
candidates' ability and, therefore, delegates the hiring decision to the latter. Once em-
ployed, the worker receives a xed wage and chooses a level of non-veriable eort that
can be exerted both in project X, which is benecial for the principal and the agent, and
in activity Y , that provides a private benet solely to the agent. The joint payo of the
principal and the agent is maximized when all the eort of the worker is devoted to project
X; however, the agent's payo is maximized when the worker's eort is exerted in activity
Y . Candidates dier in their abilities: for each level of eort exerted in project X the
high ability candidate is more productive than the low ability one. When exerting eort
in activity Y , the two candidates are equally productive. While it is public information
1In what follows, we use the female pronoun for the agent and the male pronoun for the principal and
for the workers.
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that candidates have dierent abilities, only the agent is able to distinguish among them
and this is precisely the reason why she is hired by the principal. Our aim is to capture
a situation where the agent can exploit her position in order to induce subordinates to do
certain activities that go beyond their formal job descriptions but give to her a personal
benet.2
In the Baseline treatment, the principal privately gives instructions to the agent about
which candidate to hire: either the high or the low ability one. The agent selects one
candidate and the hired worker chooses how much eort to exert in project X and in
activity Y . The agent has to follow the principal's instructions and thus cannot take any
decision. In the Selection treatment, the agent is not forced to follow the instructions
received by the principal. Moreover, the agent has the opportunity to privately suggest to
the hired worker a level of eort to exert both in X and Y . Communication renders the
agent's intentions clear: the agent's decision to select one of the two candidates may be
aimed either at increasing the prot of the organization as a whole or at getting personal
benets from the employment relationship. Compared to the Baseline treatment, we ob-
serve a signicant increase in the number of low ability candidates hired in the Selection
treatment. Moreover, we provide evidence that such a hiring distortion is due to the fact
that low ability workers exert more eort in activity Y and less eort in project X than
the high ability ones. Agents do strategically exploit the reciprocal concerns of low ability
workers who feel less entitled to get the job and thus are more grateful to the agent for
being selected.
We then examine whether distributing a small fraction of the prots to the workers is eec-
tive in limiting the emergence of backscratching reciprocity. The Baseline-Prot sharing
and Selection-Prot sharing treatments replicate the design implemented in the corre-
sponding Baseline and Selection treatments with the single dierence that the worker
receives a small fraction of the value generated in project X. In the Selection-Prot shar-
ing treatment we nd that distributing a small share of the value of project X to the
workers is eective in reducing the low ability workers' eort distortion in favor of agents
2Some concrete examples of this behavior are provided by The Conict of Interest Board (COIB),
New York. In the case No. 2010-035 (2010) COIB v. Fischetti the Senior Deputy Director for In-
frastructure Technology in the Information Technology Division at the New York City Housing Author-
ity (NYCHA) was ned for his multiple violations of the City's conicts of interest law. In particu-
lar, "he used his NYCHA subordinate, a Data Technician, to perform work on a regular basis at the
restaurant without compensation. He further admitted that he caused his subordinate to use his NYCHA
computer, e-mail account, and Blackberry to perform work related to the restaurant, at times the sub-
ordinate was required to be working for the City." For further evidence look at the COIB webpage at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/conicts/html/topic/position.shtml
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with respect to the Selection treatment. Moreover, when comparing the Baseline-Prot
sharing to the Baseline treatment we nd that workers, irrespectively from their ability,
exert signicantly higher eort in project X. Given that the share of the value of project
X distributed to the worker is very small, we suggest that such a result is not simply driven
by the monetary motive associated with the prot sharing payo structure. It seems rather
due to a positive eect on the worker's attitude toward the rm: even the presence of a
tiny link between payment and eort is shown to be relevant in shaping the way workers
perceive the organization.
2 Related Literature
There is a vast experimental literature on gift exchange games, initiated by Fehr et al.
(1993) and followed by many applications both in the lab (Fehr et al., 1997, 1998a,b, Fehr
and Falk, 1999, Charness, 2004, Eriksson and Villeval, 2012) and in the eld (Gneezy and
List, 2006, Bellemare and Shearer, 2009, Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2010, Kube et al., 2013).
In the eld, the eectiveness of gift exchange seems to depend on the details of the environ-
ment and, in particular, it could be enhanced when targeted toward reciprocal employees
(Englmaier and Leider, 2012). These studies all focus on two-tier settings and test the
positive eect of reciprocity in limiting opportunistic behaviors of workers. The novelty of
our approach consists in testing the gift exchange hypothesis in three-tier organizations.
By mean of an experiment we show that reciprocity may damage hierarchical organiza-
tions, when their members use it as an enforcement device to acquire personal illegitimate
benets.
A second branch of literature related to our paper refers to the distortions in the hiring
process due to favouritism within organizations. Several studies have pointed out that or-
ganizations' performance is usually negatively aected when candidates' evaluation is not
based on their ability (Levine et al., 2010, Kramarz and Thesmar, 2013). This can happen
when candidates are hired or promoted on the basis of subjective rather than objective cri-
teria.3Managers may indeed favor workers according to their social connections (Bandiera
et al., 2009) and personal preferences when objective evaluations of workers' performance
are not available (Prendergast and Topel, 1993), or may favor those who engage in ingra-
tiatory behavior regardless of their objective ability (Robin et al., 2014). With respect to
3An exception is provided by the eld experiment with children by Belot and Van de Ven (2011).
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these studies, we look to an additional motivation of the distortion of the hiring process:
the attempt to induce reciprocal behavior in less entitled workers by favoring them in the
selection, in the hope of receiving future benets.4 The dark side of reciprocity has already
been analyzed by scholars in other disciplines. Studies in Social Psychology underline how
recipients of (unsolicited) gifts feel indebted toward the gift givers and are more likely to
\return the favour", once requested. These studies show how individuals can trigger reci-
procity in order to gain an unfair advantage (Cialdini, 1996). In Organizational Science
backscratching is identied as (vertical) cronyism and indicates a favouritism of the su-
perior toward subordinates (as for example the assignment of promotion, bonus, pay rise,
or better job) based on criteria dierent than merit in exchange for the latter's personal
loyalty (Khatri and Tsang, 2003). Reciprocity has also been shown to be a key feature
in sustaining corruption agreements, which cannot be enforced by third parties (Abbink
et al., 2002, Abbink, 2004, Barr and Serra, 2009).5 We are not aware of any experimental
study looking at the emergence of implicit collusion sustained by reciprocity in hierarchical
organizations. In a recent study, Malmendier and Klaus (2017) analyze the emergence of
a dark side of reciprocity in a dierent context, a client-producer relationship. They nd
that when a decision maker has to buy a product on behalf of a client, and two producers
compete to sell the product, the possibility of one producer sending a small gift to the
decision maker increases the probability that the recipient chooses the gift-giver's product,
even if favoring the gift-giver will damage the client. Compared to Malmendier and Klaus
(2017), there are two main dierences in our design. First, in our experiment workers hired
by agents can reciprocate towards them without damaging their principal, and therefore
there is not necessarily a tension between reciprocating a gift and fullling a duty. Second,
our design allows us to investigate the role of subjective entitlement within organizations.
Following Schlicht (1998, p. 24), we dene entitlements as \subjectively perceived rights
that go along with a motivational disposition to defend them". In our setting, the low
ability candidate is less entitled to be selected for the job compared to the high ability
one. The relevance of subjective entitlement has been displayed by recent papers showing
that gifts oered by employers to workers who belong to relatively disadvantaged groups
and/or to the lower part of the performance distribution are likely to elicit more gratitude
4Another reason for managers to promote low quality workers is found in the fact that incompetent
managers would feel threatened by competent subordinates, and inevitably drive away competent employ-
ees (Bedeian and Armenakism, 1998). In line with this reasoning, Prendergast (1993) notes that \yes
men" tend to be concentrated among less able workers and among workers with less able managers.
5Gneezy et al. (2013) have provided experimental evidence that greed, rather than reciprocity, may
explain the emergence of corruption.
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(Baron, 2013, Montinari et al., 2016). Our ndings are in line with Kolm (2006) evidencing
how the beneciaries of (unsolicited) gift tend to feel \morally indebted" toward the gift
giver. Moreover, our contribution highlights the crucial role of subjective entitlement in
activating this feeling.
A third branch of literature related to our work analyzes how to reduce the negative eects
of internal collusion. Bac (1996) studies how hierarchical structures aect the level of cor-
ruption in an organization; Thiele (2013) suggests decreasing the incentives for employees
while increasing managers' compensations. Chang and Lai (2002) investigate the impact
of social norms on supervisors' corrupt behavior showing that, when in the presence of
corruption, paying supervisors more than workers limits workers' slack. We show that
reward systems do not only provide monetary incentives but also aect workers' attitudes
towards the corporate culture, ultimately aecting their productivity. Using a prot shar-
ing compensation scheme to increase the organizational performance, via positive changes
in employees' attitude, has already been suggested (Osterman, 1994, Knez and Simester,
2001, Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2002, Heywood et al., 2005) and is a well-known phenomenon
in the economics literature (Kerr and Slocum, 1987).
3 The Model
The model analyzes a three-tier organization, formed by a Principal (P), an Agent (A),
and a worker. The worker is selected from a pool of two candidates, a Low ability worker
(L worker) and a High ability worker (H worker).
The principal needs a worker to carry out a project but, being unable to distinguish
between the ability of the two candidates, he hires an informed agent and pays her a xed
compensation to select one of the two candidates. Once selected, the worker receives a
xed compensation and chooses how much eort x  0 to exert in the project valuable
to the principal and how much eort y  0 in a dierent activity that benets the agent,
with the overall eort resulting from the sum of the two eort components: e = x+y. The
(monetary) cost of eort c(e) is a dierentiable, strictly increasing and convex function in
the overall amount of eort e exerted by the worker, with c(0) = 0:
The principal's monetary payo is equal to P = (x+ ﬃt) ;where ﬃt is the ability of
worker t 2 fH;Lg, with ﬃH > ﬃL  0: The (hired) worker's monetary payo is equal to
t = mW   c(e), where mW > 0 is the compensation paid to the worker which does not
depend on his ability. The unemployed candidate receives a monetary payo equal to zero.
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The agent's monetary payo is equal to A = mA + y, with mA > 0. We assume that
mA > mW which implies that if a worker with ability t 2 fH;Lg exerts a total amount of
eort equal to zero, then A > H = L > P :
We assume that individuals may exhibit other regarding preferences and therefore their
utility may not coincide with their monetary payo.6 Specically, the utility function of
individual i 2 fP;A;H; Lg who belongs to the organization, is given by:
Ui = i + I
 X
j 6=i
(ii;jj   (1  i)(max f(j   i); 0g+ max f(i   j); 0g))
!
;
I 2 f0; 1g ; is an index function that takes value zero if individual i is selsh and one
if individual i exhibits other regarding preferences (ORP). Individual i0s ORP towards
individual j 6= i; are a linear combination of two components, a reciprocity component and
an inequity aversion component; i is the relative weight of the reciprocity component and
1   i of the inequity aversion. The reciprocal attitude towards individual j is described
by the parameter i;j that takes value one if individual j has been kind with individual i
and zero otherwise, and the parameter  2 (0; 1), the weight of individual j0s monetary
payo in agent i0s utility, which is assumed to be the same for every R-ORP individual.
Inequity aversion is modelled according to the standard Fehr and Schmidt model (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999) with ;   ; and 0   < 1. Individuals who exhibit ORP are
heterogeneous with respect to the weight assigned to the reciprocity component. For sake
of simplicity, we assume that i 2 f0; 1g; we then classify individuals with respect to their
preferences in: selsh (SP), inequity averse (I-ORP) and reciprocity concerned (R-ORP).
We assume that workers' preferences are not correlated with their ability and that every
player is SP, I-ORP and R-ORP, respectively, with positive probability.
We consider two dierent games. In both games the principal plays an action sP 2
fH;Lg that we interpret as the suggestion given to the agent on which worker to hire. In
the baseline game the suggestion is binding, the agent is therefore a ctitious player who
has no actions to play, and the hired worker t 2 fH;Lg chooses how much eorts x and
y to exert. In the selection game the suggestion is not binding, the agent chooses which
worker t 2 fH;Lg to hire, and the hired worked chooses the pair (x; y) of eorts to exert.
Players' reciprocity depend on their beliefs about the other players' actions. R-ORP
worker i 2 fH;Lg shows reciprocity concerns towards either the principal or the agent,
6We take as reference the model by Charness and Rabin (2002).
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depending on his beliefs s^Pi about which type of worker the principal has suggested to
hire. Specically, we assume that i;P = s^
P
i . Similarly, an R-ORP worker believes that
the agent was kind with him if he was hired against the principal's suggestion, that is
i;A = 1  s^
P
i : An R-ORP agent does not feel any reciprocity towards the principal, while
she is grateful to the type of worker who will provide her with the largest monetary payo.
Finally, principal's reciprocity towards the worker depends on his beliefs about the amount
of eort x^t that a worker of ability t 2 fH;Lg will exert. We assume that P;H = 1 if
x^H > x^L and zero otherwise, and P;L = 1 if x^L > x^H and zero otherwise, that is the
principal believes that a worker of ability t is kind with him if he exerts strictly more eort
than the other worker ﬁ 2 fH;Lg ;with ﬁ 6= t:7
We solve both games by backward induction.
Consider rst the baseline game. Starting from the last stage, selsh workers exert zero
eort both in x and y. Whatever worker i 2 fH;Lg is hired, i;P = 1, since the principal's
suggestion is binding . Given that, by design, the principal is the player with lowest mon-
etary payo (at least when x = y = 0); in equilibrium both I-ORP and R-ORP workers
exert a positive amount of eort x and zero eort in y; and the amount of eort exerted
by H and L workers, on average, is the same. Principals, irrespective of their preferences,
hire H workers because they exert the same eort than L workers but they have higher
ability. The following proposition summarizes these ndings.
Proposition 1. In the baseline game, selsh workers exert zero eort in x and y: Workers
with ORP exert a positive amount of eort x and zero eort y: On average, workers of
dierent abilities exert the same amount of eorts. Principals hire H workers.
Proof See the Appendix.
Let xBSLt (x
SEL
t ) and y
BSL
t (y
SEL
t ) denote the average eort exerted in equilibrium of
the baseline (selection) game by a worker of ability t 2 fH;Lg : From Proposition 1 we
derive the following theoretical prediction about workers' behavior:
Prediction 1. In the baseline game, on average, Hand L workers behave similarly,
exerting a positive level of eort in x and zero in y: xBSLH = x
BSL
L > 0; y
BSL
H = y
BSL
L = 0:
7Principal's reciprocity towards the agent is not relevant because the principal cannot aect the agent's
payo. Nonetheless, it is natural to assume that the principal is grateful to the agent who hires the worker
who exerts the highest eort x:
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Consider now the selection game. This game shows a multiplicity of equilibria depend-
ing on the principal's suggestion. We focus on the equilibrium in which principals suggest
to hire H workers, as in the baseline game, also because it is the unique equilibrium that
exists for any possible probability distribution over workers' preferences (in fact, it is easy
to check that this is the only equilibrium if all workers are selsh). Starting from the
last stage, selsh workers exert zero eort. Consider R-ORP workers. In equilibrium be-
liefs are correct so H;P = 1 and H;A = 0; while L;P = 0 and L;A = 1. Therefore, H
workers with R-ORP exert eort x while L workers with R-ORP exert eort y: Consider
now I-ORP workers. Since the worker has always a lower monetary payo than the agent
(even when x = y = 0) and the principal has a lower monetary payo than workers if they
choose x = y = 0, it follows that in equilibrium I-ORP workers, irrespective of their type
t 2 fH;Lg ; exert zero eort y and a positive amount of eort x:
The following proposition summarizes these ndings.
Proposition 2. There exists an equilibrium of the selection game in which principals
suggest to hire H workers. In this equilibrium, selsh workers exert zero eort. Inequity-
averse workers exert a positive amount of eort x and zero eort y, irrespective of their
ability. Reciprocity-concerned workers of ability H exert positive eort x and zero y; while
Reciprocity-concerned workers of ability L exert zero eort x and a positive eort y. Self-
ish and Reciprocity-concerned agents hire L workers, while Inequity-averse agents hire H
workers if   c
0() 1
c0( 
1 
) 1+c0() 1
; and L workers otherwise.
Proof See the Appendix.
From Proposition 2 we derive the following theoretical prediction about workers' be-
havior:
Prediction 2. In the selection game, on average, H workers behave as H (and also
L workers) in the baseline game, exerting a positive level of eort in x and zero in y:
xBSLH = x
SEL
H = x
BSL
L > 0; y
BSL
H = y
BSL
L = y
SEL
H = 0; L workers exert on average a lower
level of eort x and a higher level of eort y than H workers: ySELL > 0 and x
SEL
L < x
BSL
L :
Finally the last theoretical prediction refers to the hiring of workers.
Prediction 3 The fraction of low ability workers hired in the selection game is larger
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than the fraction of low ability workers hired in the baseline game.
Up to now we have assumed, as is customary in economics, that preferences are exoge-
nously determined by nature. According to our model, agents with ORP preferences are
either inequity averse or reciprocal. However, which component of the ORP preferences,
reciprocity or inequity aversion, turns out to be more prominent for an individual could
also be inuenced by the environment. To investigate, in an anonymous laboratory setting,
whether the features of the working environment aect which one of these two potentially
conicting preferences prevails, we consider a modication of the workers' payment. In
particular, we introduce a tiny prot sharing compensation scheme that assigns an addi-
tional small fraction of the principal's prots to the worker. Let w denote the fraction of
the principal's prots distributed to the worker. To avoid the monetary incentives could
directly inuence the worker's eort x, we assume that w < c
0(0). Nevertheless, we con-
jecture that other regarding preferences could be inuenced by the type of contract oered
to the worker. Namely, a prot sharing contract could render the principal's payo salient
to the workers, and therefore could induce all workers with ORP preference to be inequity
averse. As a consequence, any dierences between the two games, baseline and selection,
should disappear when a prot sharing contract is oered to workers.
Conjecture 1 If a prot sharing contract renders the principal's payo salient to the
workers, then Reciprocity-concerned workers of ability H and L exert positive eort x and
zero y both in the (prot sharing) baseline and selection games. In particular, workers with
ability L should behave the same in the baseline and in the selection game in the presence
of a prot sharing contract.
Before concluding this section it is worth emphasizing that our simple model predicts
that every worker never simultaneously exerts both eorts, x and y: It is easy to gen-
eralize the model to admit that some workers could choose to exert positive eort x
and y: Suppose that  has a continuous probability distribution with support [0; 1] and
Ui = i + I
P
j 6=i ii;jj + (1  i)(jj   ij)


; with 0 <   1;  < 1; and  > 1
(to avoid both components to be linear). It is easy to check that in the baseline game
all ORP workers exert positive eort x and zero y; because both reciprocity and inequity
aversion are addressed towards the principal's payo. In the selection game (focusing on
the equilibrium in which principals suggest to hire H workers) H workers, irrespective of
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their ; still exert zero eort y and positive x; while a L worker i with i 2 (0; 1) will exert
a positive amount of eort x, due to his inequity concern towards the principal, but also a
positive amount of eort y; to reciprocate the agent's kindness. Still, the qualitative results
of the simple version of the model with  2 f0; 1g remain unchanged, and, importantly,
the above Predictions still hold.
4 Experimental Design and Parameters
In our experiment we implement a between subjects analysis in a 2x2 design, where we
vary either the payo structure of the game and whether the principal or the agent is
making the hiring decision, mirroring the games discussed in the theoretical model, with
few dierences.
In the lab we render an organization composed by a Principal (P), an Agent (A), and
a worker, either of Low ability (L worker) or High ability (H worker). The principal
hires an informed agent and pays her to select one of the two candidates. The principal
gives instructions to the agent about which type of worker t 2 fH;Lg to hire, either
H or L worker, and the agent selects the worker. The selected worker receives a xed
compensation by the principal and chooses how much eort to exert in project X and in
activity Y . After the worker's decision, payos are determined and the game ends. The
non-selected candidate receives an unemployment benet. In the Baseline treatment (BSL)
participants play the game just described and the principal gives binding instructions to
the agent about which worker to hire: either L or H worker. In the Selection treatment
(SEL) players' payos are the same as in the BSL treatment, but the agent i) chooses
whether to hire worker L or worker H, since principal's suggestion is not binding anymore;
ii) may suggest to the hired worker a desired eort level to exert in X and Y .
The Baseline Prot sharing (BSLPS) and Selection Prot sharing (SELPS) treatments
are identical to the BSL and SEL treatments respectively, with the only exception that
we introduce a tiny prot sharing compensation for the workers.
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the values assigned to the parameters in each treatment,
with 10 ECUs =1 Euro implemented as exchange rate.
In the experiment, we choose ability ﬃH = 0:5 > ﬃL = 0;
8 the levels of eort exerted in
X and Y are integer numbers between f1; 2:::; 10g and f0; 1; :::; 5g respectively, and their
8Fixing a small dierence between ﬃH and ﬃL provides a more robust test for our hypotheses: every-
thing equals, we would expect a bigger dierence in ability to produce a stronger backscratching in the
SEL treatment.
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sum has to be greater than one and less than or equal to ten. Eort in project X generates
an output X = (x+ ﬃt)ﬀ which is aected by a random variable, denoted by ﬀ, uniformly
distributed on the interval [0:8; 1:2] with mean equal to one. The random variable together
with the small dierence in ability makes it harder for the principal to infer the ability of
the worker hired by the agent, since he only receives information about the value produced
in X, which is a noisy signal of both the worker's eort and ability. Eort in activity Y
generates an output Y = y, with  = 0:4, so that the workers' ability does not aect their
performance in activity Y .
Panel B of Table 1 reports the worker i' s payo function: i = mW   c(e). mW is the
xed compensation that he receives from the principal when being hired, irrespective from
his type t 2 fH;Lg and c(e) is the cost of the total eort exerted by the hired worker (i.e.
e = x+ y), which is taken from Fehr et al. (1998b), with the cost of the minimum level of
enforceable eort (i.e. x = 1 in project X) being equal to 0. The cost of exerting eort,
c(e); is an increasing function of the overall eort and does not depend on whether it is
exerted in X and/or in Y . If not hired, the worker receives a xed unemployment benet
of 10 ECUs. In the BSLPS and SELPS treatments a tiny prot sharing compensation
scheme for the worker, W = 0:075, is introduced.
Panel C of Table 1 reports the monetary payos for the agent and the principal. The
agent's monetary payo is increasing both in the eort exerted by the hired worker in
project X and in activity Y : A = AX + y + mA, where mA is a xed compensation
paid by the principal. The fraction of the output X assigned to the agent depends on the
treatment: while in the BSL and SEL treatments A = 0:15, in the BSL
PS and SELPS
treatments it is reduced to A = 0:075, in order not to change the cost of the incentive
schemes for the principal. Selsh and R-ORP agents, who believe that all workers are
payo maximizers, should choose to select H workers if A is positive. Most importantly,
the agent gets the entire amount of the output produced by the worker's eort in activity
Y = y and, since  > A  0, the agent's monetary payo is higher when a given
level of eort is exerted in activity Y rather than in project X. This creates a potential
conict between the principal's interests (who only benets from eort in project X) and
the agent's ones. The agent has also the option to ex-ante refuse the value produced in
activity Y , thus devoting it to the organization following the rules adopted to distribute the
value produced in X. Note that agents motivated by inequality aversion (I-ORP) might
prefer to choose L workers if they believe that, due to the \entitlement eect", L workers
will exert more eort than H workers. The agent's possibility to send a suggestion and to
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Panel A: Experimental Parameters
Parameter Value Treatment
x 2 f1; 2:::; 10g All
y 2 f0; 1:::; 5g All
x+ y 2 f1; 2; :::; 10g All
ﬀ  u[0:8; 1:2] All
ﬃH 0:5 All
ﬃL 0 All
 0:4 All
mA = mW 50 All
B 100 All
P 0.85 All
A 0.15 BSL, SEL
0.075 BSLPS, SELPS
W 0 BSL, SEL
0.075 BSLPS, SELPS
Panel B: Cost of total eort exerted in X and Y and Material Payos of the Worker
eort in x + y
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
All c(x+ y) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
All mW   c(x+ y) 50 49 48 46 44 42 40 38 35 32
eort in x + y
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
H Worker BSLPS, SELPS A(x+ ﬃH)ﬀ 1.1 1.9 2.6 3.4 4.1 4.9 5.6 6.4 7.1 7.9
L Worker BSLPS, SELPS A(x+ ﬃL)ﬀ 0.8 1.5 2.3 3.0 3.8 4.5 5.3 6.0 6.8 7.5
Panel C: Material Payos of the Principal and the Agent depending on the eort choices of the
hired worker.
eort in x + y
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Principal All P (x+ ﬃH)ﬀ 12.8 21.3 29.8 38.3 46.8 55.3 63.8 72.3 80.8 89.3
All P (x+ ﬃL)ﬀ 8.5 17.0 25.5 34.0 42.5 51.0 59.5 68.0 76.5 85.0
Agent All mA 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
BSL, SEL A(x+ ﬃH)ﬀ 2.3 3.8 5.3 6.8 8.3 9.8 11.3 12.8 14.3 15.8
BSL, SEL A(x+ ﬃL)ﬀ 1.5 3.0 4.5 6.0 7.5 9.0 10.5 12.0 13.5 15.0
BSLPS, SELPS A(x+ ﬃH)ﬀ 1.1 1.9 2.6 3.4 4.1 4.9 5.6 6.4 7.1 7.9
BSLPS, SELPS A(x+ ﬃL)ﬀ 0.8 1.5 2.3 3.0 3.8 4.5 5.3 6.0 6.8 7.5
eort in y
Treatment 0 1 2 3 4 5
Agent All y 0 4.3 8.5 12.8 17.0 21.3
Note. In Panels B and C the values are obtained considering a realization of ﬀ = E(ﬀ) = 1. Panels B
and C report 7:5% (15%) of the output, that is, the value produced in project X.
Table 1. Experimental Parameters, Cost Function and Material Payo Functions
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refuse the value produced in Y , are the two features of our experimental design that allow
us to understand the agent's motivation in selecting a worker of ability t 2 fH;Lg.
The principal's payo function is: P = PX+B mA mW , where P  1 is the fraction
of X kept by the principal, with A + P = 1; B is a monetary endowment while mA and
mW are the xed compensations paid to the worker and the agent, respectively.
The experiment consists of two parts. In the rst part, subjects participate in one of
the treatments described above, playing the game as one shot. In the second part, they
play the same game for 15 periods, maintaining the same role as in part 1 but under a
stranger random matching protocol (see the experimental protocol in the Online Appendix
B). In part 2 feedbacks is provided to every participant at the end of each of the 15 periods.
The principal receives information regarding the value produced in X while the agent is
informed about the eort exerted in both X and Y in their organization. Finally, all
participants are informed about: i) how many H and L workers have been hired in other
organizations within the previous period of the session and ii) the average eort exerted in
X and Y by H and L workers in other organizations.
Previous research has suggested (Keizer et al., 2008, Gino et al., 2009, Diekmann et al.,
2015) that others' norms violation aects individual choices: we thus expect that when a
\collusive" norm begins to spread among players, i.e., the proportion of agents choosing L
worker and/or the proportion of workers exerting eort in Y increases, then the propensity
for subjects to pursue their personal interest at the expense of the organization increases,
generating a snowball eect (Chang and Lai, 2002).
4.1 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was programmed using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). In all treatments, par-
ticipants were undergraduate students from the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, re-
cruited via the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004).9 We conducted 21 sessions of the BSL,
SEL and SELPS treatments at the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute
of Economics (Jena, Germany), from November 2012 to February 2013. Respectively, 216,
212 and 216 subjects participated in the BSL, SEL and SELPStreatments. 140 subjects
participated in the BSLPS treatment, at the lab of the Friedrich Schiller University in
9Each subject participated only in one experimental session. We excluded those who previously par-
ticipated in experiments featuring a gift exchange game or trust game and also those who participated
in the sessions where data for Montinari et al. (2016) were collected since their experimental design was
similar to our own.
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Jena in January 2017.10 The experimental procedures, length and average earnings were
the same in all treatments.11More details on the experimental procedures can be found
in the Online Appendix B. The duration of each session was about 110 minutes and the
average payment was 17 Euros, including a show up and participation fee of 4 Euros.
5 Experimental results
In this section we present our experimental ndings. First, we analyze the hiring decisions
(subsection 5.1). Then, we focus on the eort exerted by the workers in project X and in
activity Y (subsections 5.2) and on the agents' intention (subsection 5.3). Throughout the
analysis we will focus on the 15 periods of part 2, when information about others' behavior
is spread among participants.12 Given that spreading information may render participants'
choices in part 2 dependent upon previous periods in the same session, we perform both i)
two-sample Mann-Whitney tests and ii) Somers' D median dierence tests (Newson, 2002),
reporting in the main text only i) unless the two tests give dierent results.13
5.1 Hiring
Our rst result shows how the hiring decisions vary across treatments.
Result 1. The proportion of L workers hired is higher in the SEL and SELPS treatments
than in the BSL treatment. When hiring L workers, the majority of agents do not comply
with the instructions received by the principals.
Support for Result 1 can be found in Figure 1, which reports the proportion of principals
10We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us to run this additional treatment.
11The experimental laboratories of the Max Planck Institute of Economics and of the Friedrich Schiller
University in Jena share the same recruiting system and, therefore, the same subject pool. Subjects' invi-
tations for the BSLPS treatment were sent to exactly the same subject pool used in the other treatments,
also maintaining the same criteria for the eligibility.
12Result from Part 1 are qualitatively identical to those of Part 2 and they are reported in the Online
Appendix A, section 6. Since 5/54, 8/53, 9/34 and and 10/54 L workers are hired in the BSL, SEL,
BSLPS and SELPS treatments, respectively, the analysis on eort has very little statistical power and
would not lead to any additional benet to the reader.
13When performing the Mann-Whitney test we average the data within a session and treat each session
as a single observation. While conservative, this approach makes the power of all tests low and not robust
to outliers. To account for these limitations we use the rank order statistics Somers' D (provided by the
`somersd' package in Stata) that looks at the individuals' choices accounting for the presence of clusters
at the level of sessions in the data.
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giving instruction to hire L worker and the proportion of agents hiring L worker in part
2. In the BSL treatment 28:30% of the principals hire L workers while this percentage
increases to 47:04% when the agents are making the hiring decision in the SEL treatment.
The decision to hire L workers in the BSL treatment may be motivated by the expectation
that, feeling less entitled for the position, they will be more grateful than H workers and
therefore will exert a higher eort in project X; as a consequence, the productivity loss due
to the dierence in ability will be overcompensated, as shown by Montinari et al. (2016).14
It is important to note that in the SEL treatment, in the majority of the cases, L workers
are hired against the principal's suggestion. Specically, this happens in 58:56% (N =
219/374) of the cases.
In the BSLPS treatment principals increase the proportion of L workers hired compared to
the BSL treatment (MW test: z=1.91, p=0.06):15 the prot sharing compensation scheme
appears to render more salient for them the possibility that an \entitlement" eect could
induce L workers to feel more grateful for being hired.
Comparing the SEL and SELPS treatments, when agents are making the hiring decision,
we nd that the tendency to hire more L workers than the ones suggested by the principal
is basically unchanged (WSR tests: L suggested vs L hired, SEL z = 1:86, p = 0:06,
SELPS z = 2:29, p = 0:02). As already noted for the SEL treatment, also in the SELPS
treatment if we focus on those agents who hired L workers, we nd that the majority of
them did not follow the principal's suggestion (59:95%, N = 220=367). We interpret these
results as a distortion in the hiring process, which is not surprising if we consider that in
the SELPS treatment the agents only get A = 0:075 of the value produced in project
X, i.e. 50% less than what they got in the SEL treatment, and therefore they have less
incentive to hire H workers.
When focusing on the individual hiring decisions, we nd that in the BSL and BSLPS
treatments, on average, 52:27% of the principals decides to hire a L worker between 0 to
4 times while only 25:23% of the agents do so in the SEL and SELPS treatments; on
average 42:99% of agents hires L workers 8 or more times. This suggests that the reported
dierences between treatments are not driven by the behavior of a minority of agents.
The dynamics of the hiring decision reveals that in the SEL and SELPS treatments the
distortion in hiring emerges from the rst period and persists until the last one: the
14In Montinari et al. (2016) about 30% of employers hire low ability workers.
15All statistical tests reported are two samples and two-sided unless dierently specied. When we
have clear, explicit and theory-driven predictions about agents` and workers` behavior in the dierent
treatments we used one-sided tests.
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Figure 1: Proportion of L workers suggested by the principals and hired by the agents
across treatments
proportion of L workers hired increases across periods starting from an average of 41:12%
in periods 1   5; increasing to 47:48% in periods 6   10 and reaching 49:91% in the last
ve periods.16
5.2 Workers' eort
In the following we concentrate on the eort exerted by the hired workers. Results 2-4
state our main ndings, statistical support is provided afterwards.
Result 2. In the BSL and BSLPS treatment the average level of eort exerted in project
X and in activity Y is the same for H and L workers.
Result 2 shows that, on average, workers' reciprocity does not vary depending on the
worker's ability: in the BSL and BSLPS treatments H and L workers behave similarly
(MW tests H vs L workers: BSL, for x: z = 0:06, p = 0:95; for y: z = 0:45, p = 0:65.
BSLSEL for x: z = 0:75, p = 0:45; for y: z = 0:57, p = 0:56). Workers exert an average
eort in project X equals to 2:68 and 3:71 in the BSL and BSLPS treatments respectively,
which are signicantly higher than the minimum level of eort of 1 (Wilcoxon signed-rank
16See the Online Appendix A.1.2 for additional analyses on the dynamics of part 2.
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test, BSL: z = 2:37, p = 0:02; BSLPS: z = 7:67, p = 0:00 WSR test, henceforth).17
In activity Y both workers exert an eort signicantly higher than zero and equals to 0:89
and 0:71 in BSL and BSLPS treatments, respectively, (WSR test, BSL: z = 2:37, p = 0:02;
BSLPS: z = 7:67, p = 0:00).18
Result 3. In the SEL treatment workers exert greater eort in activity Y and less eort
in project X compared to the BSL treatment. This dierence is driven by the behavior of
L workers, who on average increase their eort in activity Y and reduce their eort in
project X.
When comparing the BSL treatment to the SEL treatment, in line with our theoretical
predictions, L workers reciprocate the agents' hiring choice. In the SEL treatment workers
exert more eort in activity Y and reduce their eort in project X. In particular, L workers
reduce their eort in X of about 17% passing from an average of 2:67 to 2:21 and increase
their eort in Y of about 81% passing from an average of 0:95 to 1:72 (MW one-sided tests:
BSL vs SEL, for x: z = 1:34, p = 0:09; for y: z = 2:75, p = 0:00). Note that, according
to our model, a positive amount of eort in Y identies the behavior of R-ORP workers;
I-ORP workers indeed would never exert eort in Y since it advantages the agent, who is
the member of the organization with highest monetary payo.19 H workers, instead, do
not signicantly modify their behavior: they exert an average eort of 2:33 in project X
and of 0:99 in activity Y (MW test BSL vs SEL, for x: z = 0:96, p = 0:34; for y: z = 0:32,
p = 0:75).
Result 4. Prot sharing is eective in limiting backscratching by L workers: dierences in
the eort exerted in activity Y are not signicant when comparing the BSLPS and SELPS
treatments.
The prot sharing compensation scheme has quite a strong eect on the eort exert-
ed in project X, despite workers only getting a small fraction W = 0:075 of the value
17In both BSL and BSLPS treatments, H workers exert less eort than L workers in project X (2:54
vs. 2:67, in the BSL and 3:46 vs. 3:98 in the BSLPS), but this dierence fails to reach signicance.
18We xed a minimum eort for project X equal to 1 and this may have created an anchoring eect,
inducing some workers to exert a positive eort in Y too.
19A worker aimed at equalizing payos of all members of the organization should exert xt = 5 and
yt = 0. In our data, a One-Sample WSR test rejects the null hypothesis that the average eort exerted by
the hired worker in project X is equal to ve in each treatment, p < 0:02 in all cases.
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generated in X. We nd that, overall, workers increases their eort in X of about 40% in
the BSLPS treatment compared to the BSL treatment, and of about 26% in the SELPS
treatment compared to the SEL treatment. This increase is signicant when considering
L and H workers separately, according to a set of MW tests, one-sided: BSLPS vs BSL,
xH , z = 2:17, p = 0:03; xL, z = 1:53, p = 0:06. SEL
PS vs SEL, yH , z = 1:45, p = 0:07;
yL, z = 2:11, p = 0:02. Moreover, we observe that the prot sharing induces a reduction of
the eort exerted in Y . When comparing the SELPS and SEL treatments, we nd that
both H and L workers signicantly reduces their eort in Y (MW tests, one-sided: yH ,
z = 1:60, p = 0:06; yL, z = 2:75, p = 0:01).
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Figure 2: Average eort exerted in project X and activity Y in each treatment depending
on workers' ability.
Further support for Results 2-4 can be found in Tables 2 and 3 and in Figure 2. Figure
2 plots, separately for H and L workers, the average eort exerted in X and Y in each
treatment.
Consider now Table 2: it compares the total eort (e = x + y) exerted by the hired
workers across the four treatments. The average total eort exerted by the hired workers
(irrespective of their ability) is equal to 3:53 and 3:63 in the BSL and SEL treatments and
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to 4:43 and 3:65 in the BSLPS and SELPS treatments, respectively. Pairwise comparisons
across treatments are not statistically signicant except for the BSL and BSLPS treatments
(z = 1:79, p = 0:07). Our results show that, overall, the treatments aect how workers
allocate their eort between project X and activity Y , but not the total eort exerted per
se. In the SEL treatment, therefore, we interpret the eort exerted in activity Y as an
eort distortion while in the BSLPS and SELPS treatments the prot sharing payment
scheme acts by shifting eort from activity Y to project X.
MW test
BSL SEL BSL vs SEL BSL vs BSLPS
H workers 3.44 3.32 z = 0:06 z = 0:90
(.51) (.96) p = 0:95 p = 0:37
L workers 3.62 3.94 z = 0:70 z = 1:64
(.89) (.45) p = 0:48 p = 0:10
MW test
BSLPS SELPS BSLPS vs SELPS SEL vs SELPS
H workers 4.05 3.52 z = 0:58 z = 0:06
(1.07) (.80) p = 0:56 p = 0:95
L workers 4.80 3.79 z = 1:54 z = 0:96
(1.73) (.87) p = 0:12 p = 0:34
Note: The tests are conducted considering each session as an independent
observation, i.e. 7(9) sessions for BSL, SEL, SELPS (BSLPS).
Table2. Average total eort (x + y) exerted by the workers, standard deviation in paren-
theses.
Additional analyses focusing on the frequency of individual eort choices reveal that the
observed backscratching is not due to the behavior of a small minority of workers, but it
is rather a widespread phenomena, see the Online Appendix A.2.1 for more details. The
dynamics of the eort exertion in X and Y reveals that in the SEL backscratching emerges
from the rst period and persists until the last one, detailed results are reported in the
online Appendix A.2.1.
Table 3 allows us to evaluate the impact of the prot sharing incentive scheme on the emer-
gence of backscratching, by performing a dierence in dierences analysis that compares
the dierence in eort exertion in project X and in activity Y between the BSL and SEL
treatments to the dierence between the BSLPS and SELPS treatments. The estimations
reported are obtained by means of from a set of Zellner's seemingly unrelated regressions,
19
which simultaneously estimates two equations (where the dependent variables are the eort
exerted by workers in X and Y , respectively) allowing for errors to be correlated. This
estimation method allows us to account for the fact that workers simultaneously choose an
eort level in X and Y . Standard errors are bootstrapped at the level of session.20
In all models we use as independent variables a set of dummies to identify the Selection
treatments (i.e. Selection takes value 1 for the SEL and SELPS treatments and 0 oth-
erwise) and the prot sharing incentive scheme (i.e. prot sharing takes value 1 for the
BSLPS and SELPStreatments and 0 otherwise). The variable L worker takes value 1 if
the worker has low ability and 0 otherwise while hired in t-1 identies whether the worker
was hired in the previous period or not. Results of the Breusch-Pagan test of indepen-
dence conrm that residuals from the two equations are not independent (p < 0:000 in
both cases), with a coecient of correlation of the residuals of around 14%.
Consider models 1a and 1b: the coecient associated to the variable Selection shows the
dierence between the BSL and SEL treatments, as the BSL treatment is the omitted
category. In model 1a, the coecient has a negative and signicant eect, while it has a
positive and signicant eect in model 1b, conrming our previous ndings: when passing
from the BSL to the SEL treatment, we observe a reduction in the eort exerted in X and
an increase in the eort exerted in Y , signalling the emergence of backscratching.
The coecient associated to the variable Prot sharing represents the dierence between
the BSL and the BSLPS treatments, which is positive for the eort exerted in X and
negative for the eort exerted in Y .
In models 2a and 2b, we introduce the interaction between the Selection and the Prot
sharing treatments. The coecient of the interaction term identies the dierence in dif-
ferences, that is the dierence in eort exertion between the BSL and SEL treatments vs
the dierence in eort exertion between the BSLPS and SELPS treatments. We observe
that this coecient has a negative and signicant eect on the eort exerted both in X
and Y , while other eects remain unchanged.
Finally, in models 3a and 3b, we introduce the interaction terms between: i) the Selection
treatment and L workers; ii) the Prot sharing treatment and L workers, and iii) the Selec-
tion treatment, the Prot sharing treatment and L workers. In model 3a, the coecients
of Selection and of the interaction between Selection and Prot sharing loose signicance,
20For the estimations, we used the \sureg" command in Stata. For the standard errors, we used the
\bootstrap" command in Stata, which executes a nonparametric bootstrap of the statistics in the list of
the explanatory variables by resampling observations (with replacement) from the data in memory 1000
times. Our results do not change if we cluster the standard errors at the subjects level.
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Model 1 2 3
a b a b a b
Estimation Method Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
Dependent variable eort x eort y eort x eort y eort x eort y
Independent variables
Selection -.556 .260 -.366  .447 -.107 .260
(.076) (.045) (.098) (.063) (.118) (.077)
Prot sharing .816 -.517 1.056 -.279 .803 -.269
(.074) (.045) (.128) (.065) (.160) (.082)
Selection x Prot sharing - - -.425 -.422 -.285 -.277
(.156) (.090) (.209) (.109)
L Worker .251 .405 .232 .386 .429 .211
(.079) (.046) (.081) (.048) (.162) (.100)
Selection x L Worker - - - - -.604 .449
(.195) (.140)
Prot sharing x L Worker - - - - .510 -.034
(.278) (.144)
Selection x Prot sharing - - - - .290 -.353
x L Worker (.337) (.196)
Hired in t-1 .036 .038 .035 .037 .062 .025
(.081) (.049) (.075) (.047) (.076) (.049)
Periods 6-10 -.263  .065 -.262 .066 -.264 .061
(.097) (.055) (.096) (.057) (.098) (.057)
Periods 11-15 -.396 -.141 -.396 -.141 -.387 -.149
(.094) (.057) (.096) (.055) (.100) (.054)
Constant 2.900 .890 2.811 .805 2.733 .871
(.109) (.064) (.108) (.068) (.118) (.072)
N 2730 2730 2730 2730 2730 2730
Subjects 200 200 200 200 200 200
Periods 2-15 2-15 2-15 2-15 2-15 2-15
Treatments BSL, BSLPS , SEL, SELPS
R2 0.059 0.079 0.062 0.086 0.071 0.091
Breusch Pagan test 14.788 13.173 19.853
Note:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. In all models standard errors are bootstrapped at the
level of 30 sessions. N identies the number of participants who took at least one decision in the
second part of the experiment. Over the 15 periods of play, both L and H workers have the chance
to be selected in each period.
Table 3. The eect of prot sharing: Comparison of BSL -SEL vs BSLPS -SELPS
the rst interaction displays a negative and signicant eect, while the second a positive
and signicant eect. No signicant eect is found for the third triple interaction, meaning
that there is no additional eect on the exertion of eort in project x that can be explained
when considering the behavior of L workers. Other results remain unchanged with respect
to model 2a.
When considering model 3b, we nd that our main results from model 2b remain unchanged.
In addition, the interaction between the Selection treatment and L workers, and the in-
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teraction between the Selection treatment, the Prot sharing treatment and L workers
display a negative and signicant eect: when considering the exertion of eort in Y , we
observe a dierence in dierences between the BSL vs SEL treatment and the BSLPS vs
SELPS treatment, plus an additional eect related to the behavior of L workers.
Our results based on the dierence in dierences analysis conrm that the prot sharing
incentive is eective in limiting the emergence of backscratching by L workers (linear com-
bination of coecients:  :419, p = 0:070): despite the agents still hiring a high fraction of
L workers in the attempt to engage in a backscratching relationship, the selected L work-
ers signicantly reduce their reciprocal response toward them, shifting their eort exertion
from activity Y to project X. Most importantly, these results indicate that reward sys-
tems do not only provide monetary incentives but they may also aect workers' attitudes
towards the organization: the small incentive provided to workers is not enough to change
their behavior because of a merely pecuniary motive.
5.3 The agents' intentions
In this section we investigate the agents' intentions by looking i) at the eort suggestions
to the hired worker and ii) at their decision to refuse the eort exerted in activity Y. More-
over, we report the results of a robustness treatment, identied as control-Selection (cSEL),
aimed at testing the role of the agent's suggestion in shaping backscratching reciprocity.
Result 5 summarizes our ndings.
Result 5. On average agents suggest exerting more eort in activity Y and less eort
in project X to L workers compared to H workers. Agents who hire L workers following the
instructions of the principal suggest on average higher eort in X compared to agents who
hire L workers against the principal's instructions. Agents who select L workers are more
likely to accept what was produced in Y in the SEL treatment than in the BSL treatment.
Support for Result 5 can be found in Table 4 and 5. Table 4 reports, for the SEL and
SELPS treatments, the average eort suggested by the agents in project X and in activity
Y , depending on the ability of the selected worker. It can be noted that in the dierent
treatments agents try to engage in a backscratching relationship in dierent ways: in the
SEL treatment they suggest to L workers to exert more eort in Y compared to H workers;
in the SELPS treatment they suggest to L workers to exert less eort in X compared to
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H workers.
SEL SELPS MW test
Eort Suggested in SEL vs SELPS
x y x y x y
H workers 4.07 2.59 4.90 2.62 z = 1:98 z = 0:45
(.71) (.55) (.85) (.84) p = 0:02 p = 0:33
L workers 3.43 3.29 4.00 2.72 z = 1:09 z = 0:96
(.88) (.33) (1.02) (.93) p = 0:14 p = 0:17
MW test: z = 1:21 z = 2:24 z = 1:73 z = 0:32
H vs L p = 0:11 p = 0:02 p = 0:04 p = 0:38
Note: The p-values reported refer to the one-sided tests. The tests are conducted
considering each session as an independent observation, i.e. 7 sessions in each treatment.
Table 4. Eort suggested by the agents, standard deviation in parenthesis.
Table 5 reports the net eect (i.e. the linear combination) of the coecients of a
Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression analysis focusing on the agents' suggestions and on
the principals' instruction. The dependent variables are represented by the eort suggested
in X and Y . We nd that the eort suggested in X is signicantly higher when a worker is
hired following the principal's instruction than when he is not, and this is true also when
restricting the analysis to the agents who hire L workers.21
Dependent Variable: Eort Suggested
in project X in activity Y
Net eect of Coecient Net eect of Coecient
Workers hired following .26** -.08
P's suggestion (.11) (.08)
L Workers hired following .47 *** -.04
P's suggestion (.17) (.11)
Note: The complete estimation of the regression is reported in Models 3 and 4 of
Table A.7 in Section A.3 of the Online Appendix A.
Table 5. Eort suggested by the agents depending on principal's instructions (Std. Error
in parenthesis).
When considering those agents who ex-ante decide not to accept the value eventually
produced in Y , we do not nd any signicant dierence in the percentage of L workers
hired in the SEL and in the SELPS treatments with respect to the BSL one (MW tests
one-sided: z = 1:05, p = 0:145, and z = 0:657, p = 0:256, respectively). On the contrary,
21The whole regression and a more complete analysis of the determinants of the eort suggestion is
provided in the Online Appendix A.3
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when considering those agents who are willing to accept what produced in Y , we nd that
they are more likely to select L workers in the SEL and in the SELPS treatments with
respect to the BSL one (MW tests one-sided: z = 2:00, p = 0:023, respectively).
Our results thus show that both the eort suggestion to workers and the possibility to
ex-ante refuse the value produced in Y are important features of our design in making the
agents' intentions clear: agents who select L workers act in this way to maximize their own
monetary payo.
However, compared to the BSL treatment, in the SEL treatment two features of the ex-
perimental design changed: 1) the possibility for the agent not to follow the principal's
suggestion and 2) the possibility to suggest to the hired worker a desired eort level. In
our robustness treatment cSEL we replicated the SEL treatment with the only exception
that the agent cannot make any suggestion to the hired worker about how much eort to
exert in X and Y . When considering both the agents' hiring behavior and the workers'
eort exertion, in the cSEL treatment we do nd a similar pattern of behavior with re-
spect to the SEL treatment, even if the eects have a lower magnitude. Compared to the
BSL treatment, L workers increase their eort in activity Y while reducing their eort in
project X. This allows us to exclude that backscratching is merely explained by the agents'
suggestion; nonetheless, the possibility of communication magnies it, by making agents'
intentions more salient to the L workers. See the Online Appendix A.4 for a detailed
analysis.
5.4 Conicts of interest and earnings
In this section we focus on how the distortions on workers' eort and agents' selection
aect the monetary payos of each member of the organization and the total earnings
achieved by the organization. Our main ndings are summarized in result 6. In the Online
Appendix A.5 we provide further analysis.
Result 6. A prot sharing compensation scheme increases the earnings of the principals
in both the BSLPS and the SELPS treatments compared to the BSL and SEL treatments,
respectively. It decreases the earnings of the agents in the SELPS compared to the SEL
treatment, displaying its eectiveness in limiting backscratching.
As regards the total earnings, the maximum amount is reached in the BSLPS treatment,
while the minimum amount is obtained in the SEL treatment.
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Figure 3: Average earnings of the Principal, Agent and Worker in each treatment.
Support for Result 6 is provided in Figure 3. With respect to the BSL treatment, the
distortions in the hiring process and in the eort exertion in the SEL treatment result in a
signicant increase of the agent's earnings and a reduction of the principal's earnings (MW
tests BSL vs SEL, one-sided: principal, z=1:98, p=0:03; agent, z=2:24, p=0:02). When
comparing the SEL and the SELPS treatments we observe that, once the prot sharing is
introduced, the principal's earnings increase while the earnings of the agents decrease (MW
test SEL vs SELPS: principal, z=1:98, p=0:03; agent z=3:13, p=0:00). In particular, in
the SEL treatment, hiring a L worker rather than a H worker is benecial for the agents,
providing them with higher earnings, while this is not the case in the SELPS treatment
(MW test one-sided H vs L: SEL z = 1:60, p = 0:06; SELPS z = 0:45, p = 0:33). The
opposite eect is observed when considering the principal's earnings (MW test one-sided
H vs L: SEL z = 1:47, p = 0:07; SELPS z = 1:09, p = 0:14).
When considering the total earnings of the organization, obtained as the sum of the
monetary payo of all its members, they decrease by about 2% in the SEL treatment with
respect to the BSL treatment. In the SELPS treatment total earnings increase since the
prot sharing aects L workers' behavior: they substantially increase their eort in X and
reduce their eort in Y, compared to the SEL treatment. In the BSLPS treatment, all
workers exert more eort than in the BSL treatment in project X, which is benecial for the
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organization: the largest amount of total earning is obtained in absence of backscratching
reciprocity.
Note that, in our design, exerting eort in activity Y would increase total earnings com-
pared to not exerting any eort at all. However, this does not seem to occur in our
experiment where, as shown in Table 2, the treatment manipulations aected the eort
allocation between X and Y rather than the total eort exerted.
To get an idea of the distortion associated to backscratching, we can calculate the hy-
pothetical earnings across all parties, i.e. the total earnings obtained if the all the eort
would have been exerted in X. The hypothetical earnings would have been equal to 135:48
and 136:26 in the BSL and SEL treatments and to 144:96 and 137:95 in the BSLPS
and SELPS treatments, respectively. By comparing the hypothetical and actual earnings
across all parties we can get a measure of the loss in the total earnings of the organization,
which is equal to 5:1, 8:17, 6:93 and 6:56 ECU`s in the BSL, SEL, BSLPS and SELPS
treatment, respectively. It can be noted how the losses in the total earnings are the high-
est in the absence of prot sharing and, in particular, in the SEL treatment, providing
additional evidence of the distortion induced by backscratching.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we provide evidence that workers' reciprocity concerns may exacerbate, rather
than alleviate, conicts of interest within a hierarchical organization. We nd that agents
are more likely to hire low ability workers than high ability ones, since they are more likely
to exert eort in an activity beneting the agent rather than the principal. The organiza-
tional performance is negatively aected by the emergence of hidden gaming, because of
the hiring and eort distortions observed in our main treatment. We show that a tiny prot
sharing compensation scheme, which may foster workers' identication with the organiza-
tion, is eective in reducing workers' inecient eort exertion in favor of their foremen.
This result is in line with the social psychology literature (Haslam, 2004) and more recent
studies in economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005, 2008) suggesting that workers' eort
also depends on how they view themselves in relation to the organization. Interestingly,
sharing part of the prots with the agents is not enough to modify their selsh behavior,
while extending this compensation scheme to workers signicantly reduces their distorted
reciprocity towards agents: other-regarding preferences seem to be more susceptible than
self-regarding ones to external stimuli induced by dierent institutional and organizational
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frameworks.
In our experiment, workers' subjective entitlements are based on their dierent abilities:
low ability workers, who do not expect to be hired, are more grateful toward their agents
compared to the high ability ones. However, other individuals' observable characteristics
could possibly be used to induce the emergence of backscratching reciprocity. For example,
the decision to hire a candidate identiable as a member of a discriminated group might
be used to make him/her feel (more) indebted towards the agent. Alternatively, agents
may favor members of their own social group expecting that the reduced social distance
strengthens their reciprocity, as in Bramoulle and Goyal (2016). Compared to the gift
exchange literature, we extend the hierarchical structure of the organization by adding an
intermediate level: we focus our attention on how workers' reciprocity toward the agent
aects the organization. However, in the present study, we do not allow the principals
to act kindly toward the agent or toward the worker, leaving room for future research to
study the eects of multiple and simultaneous exchanges of gifts among the dierent levels
of the hierarchy.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
It is straightforward to note that selsh workers exert zero eort. Consider any RORP
worker i: For both t 2 fH;Lg ; worker i is grateful to the principal, then ti;P = 1 and
ti;A = 0 and therefore y

i = 0 and x

i = c
0() 1 > 0: Consider any IORP worker i: Since
the principal has zero payo when x = y = 0; and the agent has higher payo then the
worker for any pair (x; y); then yi = 0 and x

i = c
0( 
1 
) 1: Workers exert the same level of
eort irrespective of their ability. By assumption ﬃH > ﬃL, hence principals, irrespective
of their preferences, select workers with ability H:
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that principals suggest to hire a H worker in equilibrium, and notice imme-
diately that if any principal deviates and play ~sP = L, the deviation is not observed by
any worker and therefore has no consequence. Beliefs are correct in equilibrium and there-
fore H workers behave as in the baseline game: selsh H workers exert zero eort; RORP
H worker i chooses yi = 0 and c
0() 1 = xi ; a IORP H worker i chooses y

i = 0 and
xi = c
0( 
1 
) 1: Consider now any L worker i; if he is selsh, then he exerts zero eort; if he
has RORP then Li;A = 1 and therefore y

i = c
0() 1 and xi = 0; nally if he has IORP pref-
erences then he choses yi = 0 and x

i = c
0( 
1 
) 1: Finally, selsh and RORP agents choose
L workers, because only low ability workers exert eort with positive probability; IORP
agents choose to hire L workers only if
c0() 1   (mA + c
0() 1)   (mA   c
0( 
1 
) 1);
that is
 
c0() 1
c0( 
1 
) 1 + c0() 1
:
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